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in a requirement of proving secondary
meaning. Emphasizing that protection
would be given initially only if the
trade dress were inherently distinctive
and capable of identifying the source
ofthe product, the Court noted that the
termination of protection would occur
merely because the business was not
successful enough in the market. Id
Denying protection to a unique trade
dress for this reason was unacceptable
to the Court, which opined that a business in this situation should be afa
forded protection of its unique trade
dress while it enhances its recognition
in the market. Id.
Rejecting the attempted distinction
between trade dress and trademarks,
the Court stated that there is no persuasive reason to apply different analyses
to the two. The Second Circuit allowed protection for suggestive, inherently distinctive trademarks, without
proof of secondary meaning, but denied protection to trade dress without
such proof. Id. (citing Thompson
Medical Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d
208 (2d Cir. 1985». Recognizingthat
proof ofsecondary meaning would not
be required if trademarks were inherently distinctive, the Fifth Circuit held,
contrary to the Second Circuit, that
such a rule should also apply to trade
dress. Id. at 2760 (citing Chevron
Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702
(5th Cir. 1981». Agreeing with the
Fifth Circuit, the Court further emphasized that protection oftrademarks and
trade dress serves the same end, which
is to prevent deception and unfair competition. Id. at 2760. Moreover, the
Court noted that section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act does not mention either
trademark or trade dress, and it also
does not mention secondary meaning.
Although section 1052 of the Lanham
Act mentions secondary meaning, the
Court pointed out that the section only
applies to descriptive marks, not to
inherently distinct trade dress. Id. at
2760.
In further support of its holding that
secondary meaning was not required,

the Court expressed concern that a
secondary meaning requirement for
inherently distinct trade dress would
undermine the purpose of the Lanham
Act. Id. The Court noted that the
primary purpose of the Lanham Act is
to protect the goodwill established by
the owner of a unique trademark and
the ability of customers to distinguish
among competing businesses. Id.
Trademarks also enhance competition
and quality by securing to businesses
the benefits of a good reputation. Id.
(citing Park WFly, Inc. v. Dollar Park
andFly,/nc.,469U.S.189,198(1985».
Requiring proofofsecondary meaning
would deny businesses the security of
knowing their trade dress was protected while they improved their market standing. Id.
The Court also rejected the contention that a business which used a certain design first would preclude competition by products of similar design.
Clarifying the status of the law, the
Court stated that only nonfunctional,
distinctive trade dress would be protected by section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. Id. A functional design that is
only one of a few options for competitors would not be protected, because it
would hinder free competition. Id.
However, the Court emphasized that if
secondary meaning was required, competition could be unduly burdened,
particularly for small businesses. Such
a requirement would have allowed a
competitor the opportunity to use the
trade dress of the original business in
new markets, thereby hindering the
originator's ability to expand. Id. at
2761.
In holding that secondary meaning
is not a required element of protection
for inherently distinctive trade dress,
the Two Pesos decision will protect
small business owners who have created a unique image to distinguish
their business from all others and will
guard against replication before the
business is able to establish an association between the trade dress and its
business in the market. Consequently,
competitors will not be permitted to

create a business with an atmosphere
and appearance similar to an existing
business on the basis that the trade
dress of the original business has not
yet established a secondary meaning.
- Susan L. Oliveri

Banks v. State: STATEMENTS
MADE BY VICTIM EXPRESSING
FEAR OF KILLER NOT ADMISSIBLE TO REBUT EVIDENCE OF
BA TTERED SPOUSE SYNDROME.
In Banks v. State, 92 Md. App. 422,
608 A.2d 1249 (1992), the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland held that
statements made by a victim prior to
his death expressing fear of his killer
were inadmissible to rebut evidence of
the battered spouse syndrome. The
court found that the statements at issue
were hearsay and did not fit into any of
the hearsay exceptions.
In the early evening hours of August 14, 1990, Thelma Jean Banks
("Banks") called the Baltimore City
Police and reported that her boyfriend,
James McDonald ("McDonald"), had
been stabbed. When the police arrived, McDonald was dead. Banks
initially told police that she had been
upstairs when intruders broke into the
house and stabbed McDonald, but she
eventually admitted that she stabbed
the victim.
Banks was convicted of second
degree murder by a jwy in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City and was sentenced to a term of twenty years in
prison. At trial, Banks maintained that
she suffered from battered spouse syndrome when she stabbed McDonald.
In support ofthis defense, Banks testified that the victim drank heavily and
often physically abused her. Five other
witnesses also testified that the victim
had abused Banks.
In an attempt to rebut the evidence
supporting the battered spouse syndrome defense, the state offered the
victim's mother and sister who testified that McDonald told them he was
afraid ofBanks because she physically
abused him. Lucille McDonald, the
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victim's mother, testified that on the
day before the stabbing, McDonald
telephoned her and told her that Banks
was trying to attack him with a "sickle."
The victim's sister, Ilene Muse, testified that on the day of the stabbing,
McDonald told her that he wanted to
move out of the house because he was
tired ofarguing with Banks. Additionally, two police officers testified that
they had previously investigated reports ofdomestic disputes at the home.
Officer Braxton testified that on three
occasions, the victim stated to him that
he had been assaulted by Banks. Officer Carter testified that each time he
responded to complaints at the Banks'
home, McDonald told him they were
arguing and that he was trying to leave
the house to avoid a fight.
The trial court admitted all of the
statements over objection, finding that
the statements were ''verbal acts" and
thus, not inadmissible hearsay. The
trial court explained that the statements were not admitted for their truth
as to whether Banks attacked the victim, but rather to show McDonald's
state of mind and his fear of Banks.
Banks appealed to the Court ofSpecial Appeals of Maryland and argued
that the alleged statements were irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay. The
state insisted the statements were properly admitted and relied on three alternative theories to support the holding
ofthe trial court.
The Court of Special Appeals began
its analysis by determining whether
the statements were verbal acts. Id. at
432,608 A.2d at 1254. The court defined verbal acts as "out-of-court statements [that] are operative legal facts
which constitute the basis of a claim,
charge, or defense." Id. (quoting Lynn
McLain, 6 Maryland Evidence § 801.7
"---at 278 (1987». The court recognized
that verbal acts are nonbearsay and
explained that bequest language in a
will, and language of offer and acceptance ina contract are typical examples
of verbal acts. Banks at 432, 608 A.2d
at 1254. The court noted that because
verbal acts take on a legal effect, the

reliability of the declarant is unimportant, and only the fact that the statement was made is relevant. Id.
The state argued that the statements
were verbal acts because they expressed
the victim's "fear" and "conflict avoidance." Id The court, however, concluded that the statements were not
verbal acts. The court explained that
''fear'' and "conflict avoidance" carry
no legal significance when establishing the elements of murder or manslaughter; more importantly, they carry
no significance in rebutting evidence
of battered spouse syndrome or self
defense. Id The court emphasized that
if the statements were relevant to the
state's case, the truth of the statements
must have been relevant since the state
was trying to prove that Banks had
abused the victim in the past. Id. at
433-34, 608 A.2d at 1255. Consequently, the court determined that the
statements were not verbal acts because their relevance depended on their
truth. Id.
Next, the state argued the statements were not hearsay because they
were not being offered for their truth,
but rather to show the victim's state of
mind when he was stabbed. Id. at 434,
608 A.2d at 1255. In rejecting this
argument, the court cited several cases
which have recognized that even if
statements are not offered for their
truth, they still must be relevant and
not unduly prejudicial. Id. at 435,608
A.2d at 1255-56. The court emphasized that only Banks's state of mind
was relevant to the commission of the
crime, notthe victim's. Id. at435, 608
A.2d at 1255-56. Furthermore, the
probative value ofthe victim's state of
mind was outweighed by the extremely
prejudicial nature of the evidence on
the jury. Id at 435, 608 A.2d at 1256.
Finally, the state argued that
McDonald's mother's statements were
admissible under the present sense
impression exception to the hearsay
rule. Id. at436, 608 A.2d at 1256. The
exception, codified in the Federal Rules
of Evidence and adopted by Maryland
in Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 508

A.2d 97 6 (1986), provides that "a statement describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant
was perceiving the event or condition,
or immediately thereafter" is not excluded by the hearsay rule. Banks, 92
Md App. at 436, 608 A.2d at 1256.
In Booth, a witness telephoned the
victim on the day of his murder. The
victim stated to the witness that he was
going to ask his company, a woman
named Brenda, to leave. The witness
then heard the victim's door open and
the witness asked the victim who was
there. The victim replied that Brenda
was talking to someone behind the
door. ld. (citing Booth, 306 Md. at
316, 508 A.2d at 976). The Booth
court allowed the statement into evidence as a present sense impression,
explaining that in order to fall within
the exception, the time interval between the declarant's observation and
utterance must be very short. [d. Furthermore, if in considering the surrounding circumstances there was sufficient time to permit reflection, then
the statement will not fall within the
exception. Id.
The state argued that the victim's
statement to his mother was similar to
that made in Booth, and therefore, fell
within the present sense exception to
the hearsay rule. The court, however,
noted several differences between
Booth and the present case. Id. at 437,
608 A.2d at 1256. The Booth court
found the contested statement reliable
because there was no reason for the
victim to lie about someone being at
the door. Id. (citing Booth, 306 Md. at
317,508 A.2d at 976). However, the
court distinguished Booth because in
the instant case, the victim's alcohol
problem, frequent fights with appellant, and the fact that the witness was
the victim's mother, all supplied potential reasons for the victim to lie.
Banks, 92 Md. App. at 437, 608 A.2d
at 1256. Furthermore the court reasoned that nothing in this case indicated that a short period' of time existed between the victim's observance
of the event in question and his utter23.2 IT h e Law For u m
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ance pertaining to it. Accordingly, the
court rejected the State's argument
concerning the mother's statements and
similarly rejected application of the
present sense impression excep .! . . (0
the other three out-of-court statements
made to the victim's sister and to the
police officers.
The court of special appeals thus
rejected each ofthe state's theories on
admitting out-of-court statements made
by a victim about his killer to rebut the
battered spouse syndrome defense.
Moreover, the highly prejudicial nature of the statements contributed to
the court's conclusion. Overall, the
opinion may be helpful to defense attorneys who raise the defense of battered spouse syndrome, self-defense,
or hot-blooded provocation and must
prevent the state from admitting outof-court statements of the victims in
rebuttal to such defenses. Most importantly, however, the opinion clarified
the hearsay rules regarding verbal acts,
state of mind, and present sense impression, and thus, sought to prevent
their misuse by practioners and trial
judges in the future.
- Heather L. Ashbury

Morgan v. Illinois: TRIAL
COURT'S REFUSAL TO INQUIRE WHETHER A POTENTIAL JUROR WOULD AUTOMA TICALL Y IMPOSE THE
DEATH PENALTY UPON CONVICTION WAS INCONSISTENT
WITH THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT.
In Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct.
2222 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that during voir dire
in a capital offense case a defendant is
entitled to challenge for cause and have
removed a juror who would automatically impose the death penalty, irrespective of the facts of the case or the
trial court's instructions. In so holding, the Court proposed a due process
review standard which requires a trial
court to question venire panels about
their position on capital punishment.

In the state of Illinois, capital offense cases are tried in two phases. The
same jury may determine both a
defendant's guilt and the sentence, or
the defendant may elect to waive sentencing by the jury. Upon conviction
for a capital offense, a separate sentencing hearing is held to determine if
aggravating and mitigating factors existed. A unanimous jury must find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least
lout of 10 aggravating factors were
present in order to sentence the defendant to death. The defendant is given
the death penalty if the defendant is
eligible and the jury unanimously finds
no mitigating factors.
In 1990, Derrick Morgan was paid
$4,000 by an inner-city gang to kill a
narcotics dealer who was also his friend.
Morgan lured the victim into an abandoned apartment and shot him in the
head six times. After weighing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, an Illinois jury convicted the
petitioner of first degree murder and
sentenced him to death.
At trial in the Circuit Court for
Cook County, State prosecutors invoked their rights under Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), in
which the United States Supreme Court
held that a state may excuse for cause
any venire members whose strong opposition to the death penalty would
render them unable to impose death
regardless ofthe circumstances. Consequently, the trial judge asked those
eventually empaneled whether any
would automatically vote against the
death penalty, irrespective ofthe facts.
The trial judge denied a similar request by the defense for a "reverseWitherspoon" inquiry, which would
have asked whether any juror would
automatically vote to impose the death
penalty regardless of the facts. Because the trial judge asked questions
concerning the jurors fairness and impartiality during voir dire, the court
found thatthe voir dire was ofthe same
general nature as the "reverseWitherspoon" inquiry. Morgan, 112 S.
Ct. at 2226.

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
and held that the "reverse- Witherspoon"
inquiry was not constitutionally required. It also found the Morgan jury
fair and impartial because each juror
had sworn to uphold the law and none
expressed partial views. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether, during voir dire
for a capital offense, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a trial court to refuse to ask
whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty
upon conviction.
The Court first confirmed the impartiality requirement imposed upon a
jury during the sentencing phase of a
capital offense case. [d. at 2228. The
Court invoked its decision in Turnerv.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), in
which the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause required impartiality to the same
extent required underthe Sixth Amendment of any jury empaneled to decide
a case. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229.
Next, the Court determined, in accordance with the holding in Wainwright v. Witt. 469 U.S. 412 (1985),
that when a juror's views on capital
punishment would impair the performance of her duty to follow instructions, such a juror is not impartial and
must be removed for cause. Morgan.
112 S. Ct. at 2229. In support of its
conclusion, the Court cited its decision
in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81
(1988), in which a juror who would
have automatically voted for the death
penalty was removed by preemptory
challenge. The Court determined that
the failure to remove the juror forcause
was error under the standard set forth
in Witt. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229.
The Court next addressed whether
a trial court must inquire into a juror's
views on capital punishment upon a
defendant's request. Voir dire, the
Court stated, is a critical method of
effectuating the criminal defendant's
right to an impartial jury. [d. at 2230.
Only with the proper voir dire can a
trial judge fulfill the responsibility of
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